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IN THE HOPE OF A NEW BIRTH OF THE ONE FORM
OF ACTION.
"It is a tragedy when a good cause of action is lost by
failure to observe some rule of practice."a

I. As

A FELT NEED IN THZ COURTS.

Virginia's Early Call for Help.
tAT ERE it not that I think myself tied down, and bound by
Vv
precedents," said a Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in 1808, "I should have differed in opinion from
the Judges who have preceded me on the first great point in this
case, (to wit, the nature of the action,) because it does appear to
me, from the reason of the thing, and upon sound general principles, that three things only are essentially requisite to maintain
an action: 1st. That the plaintiff make out such a case as will
entitle him to recover; 2dly. That he state his case in such a manner as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity of making a full
and complete defence; and, 3dly. So that a recovery in the suit
may be pleaded in bar to any future action for the same cause.
All this seems to have been done in the case now before the Court."
The remark is a dictum by Fleming, J., delivering one of the
three concurring opinions in the earnestly discussed case of Taylor v. Rainbow.1 In its day this was a leading case in the docSenator Thomas J. Walsh.

In Minority Report, Judiciary Committee, on

Uniformity of Procedure Bill, U. S. Senate, July 1, 1926.
' 2 Hen. & M. 423, 444-445 (Va. 1808).

v. Rainbow were as follows:

Briefly put, the facts in Taylor

The defendant, "through neglect and want of

due care," but without design to harm, had discharged a loaded gun in a public place where many persons were assembled. The shot thus discharged
struck the plaintiff in the leg, wounding him so grievously that his leg was
amputated. As a result he was put to great expense for surgical and medical treatment, and was disabled for carrying on his business. With these
facts, the plaintiff sued in trespass on the case, went to trial under the gen-

VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

trine of the Common Law Forms of Action; on its facts and the
reasoning of the Court it is even in this day a noteworthy case in
the history of the rise of the One Form of Action in America and
in England. It brought before -the Court, in an unusually clear
cut form, what was to become the leading question in that long
continuing movement in Anglo-American law for such a change
in our judicial procedure as would prevent the "tragedy" to which
Senator Walsh has referred, when, as happens so frequently, "a
good cause of action is lost by failure to observe some rule of
practice." 2
In Taylor v. Rainbow there was but one question considered br
eral issue, and obtained a verdict in heavy damages. On a second trial he
again had a large verdict. The judgment of the trial court followed the verdict. This judgment was affirmed in the District Court and the defendant
thereupon went to the Supreme Court of Appeals, with the one question
whether trespass on the case or trespass %i et armis was the proper action.
2 Report of U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee, July 1, 1926, on Uniformity of Procedure Bill; Minority Views, against passage of the bill, expressed
by Senator Walsh, page 22.
The effect of this minority objection last July was to postpone once more
the passage of the Uniformity Bill. Within four weeks after this postponement, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, gave a striking
illustration of the mischief which the Uniformity Bill is designed to prevent.
The case is Denison-v. Keck, Fed. (2d) 384 (July, 1926). Here the complainants, out of possession, sued in equity, claiming ownership in fee simple
and the right to immediate possession of certain real estate, and alleging that
the defendants claimed some right, title, and interest in this real estate, and
were in possession thereof. The complainants asked to have their title quieted, and for a cancellation of a mortgage. No objection was made by defendants that there was an adequate remedy at law. From a decree for complainants, the defendants appealed. Held by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
that, the District Court, "sitting as a court of equity, had tried an action at
law," and that the decree must be reversed; "when it is quite obvious," said
the court, from the case presented and tried as a suit in equity, "that there is
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law," it is the duty of the appellate
court to raise the objection sua sponte.
Here, it will be observed, in a case where the real controversy revolved
around the question of legal title and the possession of land, the decision of
the court, in setting aside the decree entered by the trial court, was based, not
on a mistake in substantive law, but upon a failure to observe a rule of practice in a court administering both law and equity.
How far this result, if subjected to the test of substantive justice, falls behind the result reached even in the early, days of the One Form of Action,
will appear from such cases as White v. Lyons, 42 Calif. 279 (1871) ; Leonard
v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 540 (1866); New York Ice Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co.,
23 N. Y. 357 (1861); Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270 (1858).
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the court, whether, on the facts of the case, the plaintiff should
have sued in trespass vi et armis rather than in trespass on the
case. The objection that he had mistaken his form of action was
not a threshold objection. The plaintiff's cause of action had
been fully presented on its facts, tried twice and twice established.
The defendant had received as full notice of the plaintiff's cause,
and had been given as full opportunity to defend and to prepare
for trial, as he could have had if the form of action seliected had
been trespass and not case. The Supreme Court was unanimous
in holding that the plaintiff had mistaken his form of action, that
he should have sued in trespass and not in case. With this result, the real question was essentially whether substantial justice
should be sacrified to a Form of Action. Apparently the two
lower Courts had in turn disregarded the nice distinction between
trespass and case, somewhat as the English Common Pleas in
1767 had refused "to look with eagle's eyes" to see whether an
action in case should have been in trespass if the court can see
that "the plaintiff has obtained a verdict for such damages as he
deserves.' 3 But this the Supreme Court would not do. Neither
would it resort to a judicial camouflage under which, while professing to maintain the distinctions between the Forms of Action,
the Court could regard the action at bar as in trespass or in case,
according as substantial justice might require. 4 With expressed
regret on the part of each of the three judges, .they concurred in
reversing the judgment for the plaintiff.
The Law vs. Common Sense and Common Convenience.
Few cases before or after this Virginia decision in 1808 illus* Slater v. Baker, 2 Wilson, 359, 362 (1767), per Curiam:

"That the

plaintiffs ought to receive a satisfaction for the injury, seems to be admitted;
but then, it is said, the defendants ought to have been charged as trespassers

vi et armis; the court will not look with eagle's eyes to see whether the evidence applies exactly or not to the case; when they can see the plaintiff has
obtained a verdict for such damages as he deserves, they will establish such
verdict if it be possible."
, This was strongly urged by one of the plairqtiff's attorneys: "If we are
left unfettered by the decisions of the English Courts, no good reason can
be given why this action is not case as well as trespass. The defendant has
plainthe same opportunity of defending himself, has as full notice of the
Rainv.
Taylor
trial."
for
prepared
fully
as
be
may
and
action,
of
tiff's cause
bow, supra note 1, at 430.
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trate so well the tyranny of the Forms of Action. Few cases or
none had made a stronger appeal for a radical change which
would enable the Courts to prevent the denial of justice, or its
grievous delay, merely because counsel had erred on a question
of formal procedure in a case in which a good cause of action had
been established in the trial court. In its decision, Taylor v. Rainbow was in line with accepted precedents, in full accord with the
standard doctrine that "we must keep up the boundaries of actions or we shall introduce the utmost confusion." 5 It had the
support of an array of "strong decisions," English and American-"strong," that is, within Chief Justice Erle's definition, as
decisions which followed the precedents to the uttermost, but were
"opposed to common sense and to common convenience.", And
there were judges in his day, said the Chief Justice, "Who delighted in nothing so much as in a strong decision." 7 But Taylor
v. Rainbow was not a decision in which the judges rendering it
"took delight." Their opinions expressed the reluctance of each
of them to decide against the real merits of the case, and contained, in substantial effect, a suggestion that "from the reason of
the thing and upon sound general principles" there should be "an
action" in which the administration of justice should be free from
the restrictions of a hard and fast formulary system of pleading.
This expressed discontent with the common law formulary sysThus, the Chief Justice in Reynolds v. Clarke, 1 Strange, 634, 635 (1725),
where, with a cause admitted on the records, the plaintiff failed because he
had sued in trespass when he should have sued in case. So, a century later,
with many like cases between, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that "the
necessity of preserving the boundary of actions" (thus the Court described
the situation) required the dezcal of substantial justice in a cause of action
pleaded and proven before them. Case v. Mark, 2 Ohio 169, 173 (1825).
321.
' 1 SENIOR, CONVERSATIONS WITH DISTINGUISHED PERSONS (1878)
" "The indifference to real and unreal, and so to right and wrong, which
besets a barrister bred in the world of words rather than of facts, often follows him to the bench. Besides this, I have known judges, bred in the world
of legal studies, who delighted in nothing so much as in a strong decision.
Now a strong decision is a decision opposed to common sense and to common convenience. * * *
"A great part of the law made by judges consist of strong decisions, and
as one strong decision is a precedent for another a little stronger, the law at
last on some matters becomes such a nuisance, that equity intervenes, or an
Act of Parliament must be passed to sweep the whole away." Chief Justice
Erle, in 1 SENIOR op. cit supra note 6, at 320-321.
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tem of actions and this expressed suggestion of the need of relief through the creation of one form of action gave promise of
coming good. But it was long in coming; indeed, it has not yet
fully come. The "strong decisions" continued, but with a growing protest through the first half of the last century. We have
courts of law-so the protest ran, and we have a court of equity;
but have we a court of justice ?'
If the lawyers of today could go back a century in their professional habit of thought as to civil procedure, they would find
nothing surprising in the firm hold which the distinctions between
the common law actions and between these, actions as a class and
the suit in equity then had upon Bench and Bar. The Forms of
Action were our Institutes of the Law. ' Through some five hundred years our forefathers at the Bar had thought in the terms of
these forms, and were accustomed to make them, almost instinctively, the tests of right and obligation under the law. With
this habit of thought there was a co-operating influence which
naturally had a wide effect. Why should the work of years be
discarded and a radically different system be instituted? Why
should practicing lawyers and judges busy in the trial of cases, be
required to ignore the ancient land marks, and to find their way
The distinction was pointedly made in the early stages of the reform
movement in England and in America. "In this country equity decides equity
and law decides law. But is there, we ask, for it comes to this, is there in
all England a single tribunal which administers justice? Would it be presumptious in us, would it be untrue, to say that there is not." ENG. LAW
MAGAZINn as quoted in the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1850. 1 Ohio
Debates 559.
The adoption of one form of action has made "courts of justice" possible
in many Anglo-American jurisdictions; but in no State of the Union have
they been fully attained. In our own day President Wilson repeated the call
to "make courts of justice out of courts of law." See his address in New
York, November, 1916.
1 "Our forms of action are not mere rubrics nor dead categories; they are
r~ot the outcome of a classifactory process that has been applied to pre-existing materials. They are institutes of the law; they are-we say it without
scruple-living things.

*

*

*

"Those few men who were gathered at Westminster round Pateshull and

Raleigh and Bracton were penning writs that would run in the name of kingless commonwealths on the other shore of the Atlantic Ocean; they were
making right and wrong for us and for our children." 2 PoLOCK AND MAITLANDI HISTORY Ol ENGLISH LAW 561, 674.
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along an unknown, unmarked course, in the midst of dangers of
which they had neither knowledge nor warning?
The same professional habit of thought as to the distinctions
between the actions at law and the procedural separation between
law and equity had a retarding influence in the forty years' effort
in England to obtain a more efficient system of civil procedure.
At "long last" there began to grow up, in the minds of the English reformers, "the vision of a great and united Supreme Court
of Justice, with uniform principles, uniform law, and uniform
procedure." -1 But as late as 1852, after twenty years of agitation, English lawyers hesitated over an avowed abolition of th6
rorms of Action. This had been recommended by the Common
Law Commissioners; but it was supposed that if the recommenda'
tion was adopted, "the law would be shaken to its foundations." "
Approaching One Form of Action Through JudicialConstruction.
With the decisions which held a cause of action, admitted or
proven before the Court, to the test of a most rigid formalism,
there appeared, as time went on, decisions which permitted -the
mere form of action to "bend to the substantial justice of the
case." 12 Some judges, looking to the convenience of justice.
would permit a considerable degree of variability in the same
form of action. 13 As "an indulgence granted on account of the
0 JXNKS,

SHORT HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW

(1920)

372.

"' See the remark of Bramwell, L. J. in Bryant v. Herbert, 3 C. P. D. 389,
390 (1878).
As a result, the elaborate Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, in striking contrast with the New York Code of 1848, contained no provision which
expressly abolished the forms of action; but the English Statute, as described
by Lord Justice Bramwell, merely "provided as far as possible that, though
forms of actiorA remained, there never should be a question what was the
form."
Claflin v. Wilcox, 18 Vt. 605, 609 (1846); where Judge Redfield approved "the rule of practical common sense, of making, as far as can well
be done, the mere form of the action bend to the substantial Justice of the
Case."
In Ditcham v. Bond, 2 M. & S. 436 (1814), the declaration in trespass
was framed in four counts: for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house,
for assaulting and beating him, and for beating his servant per quod servitiusn
anisit. Under a plea of not guilty the plaintiff had a verdict. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment because of a misjoirnder, on the ground that
the last court was in case. "And he argued that the actions for beating the
plaintiff's servant, or for seducing his daughter, or for adultery with his
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difficulty of tracing the dividing line" between trespass and
case, 14 one occurrence might sometimes be treated as giving rise
to either trespass or case, at the election of the plaintiff. 15 And
now and then a statute lent a helping but cautious hand in making
the procedural boundaries of, certain actions at law somewhat
elastic. A Virginia statute in the second quarter of the last century provided that "in any case in which an action of trespass
will lie, there may be maintained an action of trespass on the

case." I Similar statutes appeared in other states.

17

This later, ameliorating doctrine, however, was stoutly rejected
in some cases as fundamentally unsound. I The net result was a
wife, per quod consortium or servitium atnisit, all stood on the same ground,
and had been treated by this court as actions upon the case." Several cases
in support of this were cited. Lord Ellenborough saved the case at bar or%
this principle: "For some purposes indeed we have considered it as case,
but for general purposes we will leave it where the ancient forms and the
most recent decisions have placed it. We restore the old practice and adopt
the last case."
" Pearson, J., in Kelly v. Lett, 13 Iredell Law (35 N. C.) 50, 54 (1851).
" "The question is not whether trespass will lie, but whether case will not
lie also; and I have known from pretty long experience that either will lie."
Lord Abinger, C. J., in Chamberlain v. Hazlewood, 5 M. & W. 515, 517 (1839).
So also Parke, B., in same case: "There may have been no direct decision on
this subject, but it has been the constant practice with pleaders to declare either
in one form of action or the other."
" Va. Code (1849), c. 148, § 7, Code of 1904, § 2901.
' This Virginia Statute was adopted in West Virginia, Code 1906, Art. 3491.
It throws an interesting light on the hesitating application of this liberalizing
enactment that it was construed strictly, according to its letter: "It is provided that 'in any case in which an action of trespass will lie, an actiorn of
trespass on the case may also be maintained.' But the converse is not provided; and the action of trespass, therefore, as to the cases in which it will
lie, remains as at Common Law." Per Berkshire, P. J., in Barnum v. B. &
0. R. R., 5 W. Va. 10, 16 (1871). Accordingly, in both these States, the
pleader when in doubt whether to bring trespass or trespass on the case, was
advised to sue in trespass. See Jordan v. Wyatt, 4 Gratt. 151, 152 (Va. 1874),
note.
In Ohio a statute in 1845, did away, "in some degree with the embarrassing
differences between trespass and trespass on the case." 0. L., Vol. 42, p. 72.
It was regarded by the Ohio Code Commissioners in 1853, "as the beginning
of the work we propose to finish" through the enactment -of the one form of
action. Report 1853, p. 5 referring to 42 Ohio Law 72.
's The question was earnestly considered by the Ohio Supr~tne Court in 1825,
Case v. Mark, 2 Ohio 169. The result was a re-affirmation of the rule as
"clearly and judiciously settled, that where the injury is direct and immediate
the action must be trespass, whether the act were done willfully or by ,negli-
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frequent uncertainty and confusion in the use of the common law
actions. As late as 1849 the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
frankly seeking a rule which "will do substantial justice to parties
without involving them in that doubt, perplexity, uncertainty,
and technical absurdity into which some of the adjudged cases
[on the distinction between Trespass and Case] might seem to
lead them." 19
But in all this there was a latent promise of progress towards
a more simple and efficient administration of justice. A vision of
one Court with full jurisdiction in law and in equity and with one
instrument of remedial justice was slowly growing in the mind
of some .American reformers. To them, it seemed, that if the
courts lacked authority or purpose to reach this result through judicial construction, relief should come through legislation.
Outside the influence of mediaevalism in our Anglo-American
civil procedure there was nothing essentially abnormal in the
principle of one form of civil action for all causes at law and in
equity. The practical convenience of having one instrument of
remedial justice, instead of the historic armory with its many
weapons each for a special use, 20 had long been felt in our
gence and want of case," Per Burnet, J., p. 179. In support of his opinion,
Judge Burnet made this remark at page 173: "One of the reasons given for
not sustaining actions on the case where the circumstances amount to a clear
trespass, and vice versa, is the necessity of preserving the boundary of actions,
by which I understand the rules that prescribe what particular action or form
.f suit, shall be brought for each particular injury. These rules cannot be
uniform, if plaintiffs are permitted to garble their cases, so as to convert an
unequivocal trespass into trespass on the case. Were this permitted, I cannot
conceive of any trespass that may not be sued for in the form of case."
" Haile, J., in Brennan v. Carpenter, 1 R. I. 474, 475 (1849).
:'"The metaphor which likens the chancery to a shop is trite; we will liken
it to artarmoury. It contains every weapon of medieval warfare from the
two-handed sword to the poniard. The man who has a quarrel with his neighbor comes thither to choose his weapon. The choice is large; but he must remember that he will not be able to change weapons in the middle of the combat and also that every weapon, has its proper use -and may be put to none
other. If he selects a sword, he must observe the rules of sword-play; he
must not try to use his cross-bow as a mace. To drop metaphor, our plaintiff is not merely choosing a writ, he is choosing an action, and every action
has its own rules.
The great difference between our medieval procedure and that modern procedure which has been substituted for it by statutes of the present century
lies here." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 9,-at 561.
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Courts. American lawyers eighty years ago were familiar
enough with an evolutionary process which had been slowly working in the courts for generations. Through judicial construction, running sometimes into judicial legislation, resorting sometimes to fictions, a common law form of action had slowly
widened its range while preserving its letter. Ejectment had
supplanted many highly differentiated real actions, and become
generally available to recover possession of land. Trespass on
the case had developed into a general residuary tort action; within its scope were broad classes of torts, some resting on acts of
absolute liability, some on negligence, some on malice. No one,
it was said, -had sounded the depths of Trespass on the Case.
The Action of Assumpsit, developing far beyond the limits of a
strict contract action, had usurped a large part of the 'field of
Debt; it had become available even in cases where an actual contract between the parties could not be inferred from the facts of
the occurrence but where, from "the equity of the plaintiff's case,"
the defendant was under an obligation to refund as if there had

been a contract.

21

Long before 1848, the courts, through century-long judicial
construction, had been developing a system of pleading based
upon a few broad forms of action which, each in its 6wn extensive
sphere, was a quami one form of action. Logically, the one form
of action for all civil causes, at law and in equity, although requiring perhaps the aid of legislation, should have been on a far
judicial horizon, as a result which was both possible and to be

desired.
"

22

Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1008 (1760).

The hesitating caution of some Courts in this reform is illustrated in the
history of the Michigan Constitutional provision of 1850 that "The Legislature shall, as far as practicable, abolish distinctions between law and equity
proceedings." (Art. VI, Section 5.) Referring to this provision Professor
Sunderland, of the University of Michigan Law School, made this remark in
1916: "Evidently there was a popular demand for a reform of the same general character as that introduced in, New York, and the people through their
constitution did all that peremptory language could do to obtain suitable legislation on the subject. But the legislature failed to carry out the people's
mandate. Instead it sought to shift the task upon the Supreme Court, and in
1851 a statute was passed which provided that--'The judges of the Supreme
Court shall have the power, and it shall be their duty, within three months
after this law shall take effect, by general rules to establish, and from time
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II. THE

STATUTORY ONE FORM ov

ACTIoN.

The One Form of Action made its appearance as a working
principle in our civil procedure in the revolutionary year 1848.
It came in a.way that was shockingly different from the way in
which procedural reforms through judicial construction had
come in Anglo-American law-slowly bringing in the new under
the guise of the old. The age-long reign of the Forms of Action,
at least their reign de jure, was terminated by the most direct
legislation, and with almost dramatic suddenness. 23
Short and positive enactments, passed under high pressure,
abolished expressly the distinctions between the different actions
at law, the distinctions between actions at law as a class and suits
in equity, the forms of all such actions and suits then or previously in use, and "all the forms of pleading heretofore existing."
By the same legislative fiat there was thenceforth to be "but one
to time modify and amend, the practice in said Court and in the Circuit courts,
* * * and they shall, once at least in every two years thereafter, if necessary, revise the said rules, with a view to the attainment, so far as may be
practicable, of the following improvement in the practice: 1. The abolishing
of the distinctions between law and equity proceedings, as far as practicable.
"Probably the legislative conscience was satisfied by the passage of this
act, for nkothing more was done by the legislature for more than sixty years.
Doubtless also the Supreme Court was not at all disturbed by this gratuitous
bequest from the legislature, for no response was vouchsafed by the court.
For two-thirds of a century the legislature has waited for the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court has waited for the legislature, and until the last session the people failed to obtain relief, although the same demand for legislative action was repeated in the constitution of 1908.
"In the Judicature Act of 1915 the legislature at last took up the matter..
It did not in terins abolish all distinction between legal and equitable proceedings, as the New York Code had done. Its language is much less sweeping
and its immediate object much less pretentious, but a brief survey of the results
reached by the reforms in New York and elsewhere will show that the modest provisions of the Judicature Act have really covered a considerable part of
the available field of reform."
" The first report of the New York Commissionqers on Practice and Pleadings, providing for the abolition of the forms of actions and pleadings in cases
at common law and for a uniform course of proceeding in all cases, whether
of legal or equitable cognizance, was reported to the legislature about the first
of March, 1848. The bill was considered, amended in some 80 of its 391 sections, and passed before the middle of the following month (N. Y. Laws of
1848, c. 371. Act of April 12). This impetuous haste appears in the enactment of most of the earlier Codes.
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form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights
and the redress of private wrongs." To this new instrument of
remedial justice, the statutes gave the name of "civil action," and
declared that the forms of pleading in the civil action, and the
rules by which the sufficiency of the pleadings was to be determined, "shall be those which are prescribed by this act."
By such legislation in 1848 the One Form of Action, for the
first time in the history of Anglo-American law, was given an
authoritative place in the administration of civil justice, whether
at law or in equity, or in both. Its enactment in New York was
followed in rapid succession by its enactment, within five years,
in Missouri, California, Kentucky, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana,
and Ohio. Within the next five years it had been enacted in
Oregon, Washington, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. By the end of
1868 the legislatures of Kansas, Nevada, Dakota, Idaho, Arizona,
Montana, North Carolina, and Arkansas, had required its adoption by the courts. Within the next eleven years, 1869-1879, it
was enacted in Wyoming, South Carolina, Utah, Colorado, and
Connecticut. 24
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the English Judicature Acts and Rules of 1873-75 had in effect abolished the
Forms of Action, in their ancestral home, and in their stead had
established an "action" of so wide a scope that it included causes
at law, causes in equity, probate causes, and causes in rem or in
personam in admiralty.
Thus, within the course of thirty-one years after 1848, this
sudden, revolutionary change, affecting the habits of thought and
the daily work of a most conservative profession, had become an
accomplished result in the State Courts of more than half of the
Union, and in England. A perfect result it was not, and naturally so. It was a first effort in a wide and difficult field. Some
of its provisions were crude or incomplete. It lacked facilitating
devices, as, for instance, a procedural device which would enable
the court, acting through officers appointed for the purpose, to
exercise a supervision and effective control over the preparation
of cases for the trial dockets. It stood in special need of "the
I In later years the Code was enacted in the then Territories of Oklahoma
and Indian Territory (1890), New Mexico (1897), Alaska (1900), the Philippine Islands (1901), Porto Rico (1904).
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advantage of experiment in the laboratory of the courts." 25 But
it is significant that with the faults and defects of a pioneer effort
in our law, and open to repeal by any legislature, this system of
one form of acti6n pleading still endures in all the States named
above. 26

III. RETARDING CAUSES IN THE COURTS.
With such a beginning, it might have seemed fairly safe to
prophesy that the one form of action would ere long supplant our
inherited formulary system in most of the other State Courts and
in the Federal Courts in all the States. The signs now point to.
such a result in the near future, at least for the Federal Courts.
But it was not to come speedily. A little after 1870 there was a
notable slowing down of the movement in America for the adoption of Code pleading. The revolutionary impulse of 1848, with
its wide popular support, lost its force in the course of one generation; and there were, from the first enactment of the Code, several
causes which tended actively to retard. In the first twenty-seven
years after 1870, code pleading was adopted in only four States
of the Union. 27 In the next twenty-nine years no American
' See Chief Justice Taft's address before the American Bar Association
in 1922, 47 A. B. A. RnP. 268.
" One State, and orqly one, has repealed the Code. Florida enacted it in
1870, apparently under stress of the reconstruction days, but repealed it in
1873. The resulting system of pleading in Florida is based on the common
law rules except as modified by statute or rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court under statutory authority. Mechanics and Metals Nat. Bk. v. Angel,
79 Fla. 761, 85 So. 675, 678 (1920). These modifications are many and varied.
They frequently bring the new and the old izto one setting. They maintain a.
procedural separation between law and equity, yet with changes that suggest an
approach towards a unit procedure. See Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1920), §§ 25612667, §§ 3107-3245, and especially §§ 2624-2667 (Pleadings at Law) and
§§ 3116-3131 (Pleadings in Chancery).
This system, it would -seem, has not given full satisfaction, A Statute of
1925 requires the Governor to appoint "five lawyers of eminent ability as Commissioners on Reform of pleading and practice in the Courts of this State
* * * to the end that the administration of law and justice may be simplified and expedited in this State." Laws of Florida (1925) 400. Possibly
we are seeing in Florida, as in England and in our Federal Courts, a movement up a line -of cautious statutes towards a simple and scientific system for
the administration of substantial justice.
' Colorado in 1877, Connecticut in 1879, Oklahoma in 1890, New Mexico
in 1897. The last two were Territories when their codes were first enacted.
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State adopted the Code. 2 The result is the more significant because, within this period, various procedural reform movements
appeared in the United States, with important results in several
of the older States. 29
These retarding causes have been, in the main, quite distinct
from a deliberate judgment upon the essential value of one form
of action for legal and equitable relief. They have resulted in a
state of mind which was significantly expressed last July. by Senator Walsh, when he submitted the views of a minority of the
Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate against the
passage of the Uniformity of Procedure Bill. Referring to the
Code of 1848, the outcome of David Dudley Field's long efforts,
Senator Walsh makes this remark:
"Field entertained the hope that his Code, or something modeled
upon it, would come into universal use. I have never been
able to understand why it has not. Having been bred under
it, I am convinced it app2oaches as near simplicity and perfection as any mere human work may. But I know that to
a multitude of lawyers, among the most eminent and learned
at the American Bar, it is anathema, and that a very considerable number of States will have nothing of it." '6
Perhaps it may be worth while to notice the source and nature
of causes producing such a result within a learned profession.
"Justice is not to be taken by storm; she is to be wooed by slow
advances," so Judge Cardozo has recently pointed out. 3 We
are still witnessing, it may be, some of the effects of an attempt
to take procedural justice by storm. In its sudden impetuosity,
its wide sweep, its devastating effect upon the long established
principles of our procedure, the movement which brought on the
American Codes came as a storm of startling violence and extent.
Its rapid progress from State to State was ascribed to "a craze
for reform which had swept over the country as a tidal wave." 32
1 But a code was enacted in Porto Rico in 1904.
As in New Jersey, "The Practice Act" (1912), N. J. Laws, 1912, c. 231,
pp. 377-416; in Pennsylvania, The Pracfice Act, 1915, Pa. Laws 1915, 483487, Pa. State 1920, §§ 17,062-17,326; in Michigan, the elaborate "Judicature
Act of 1915," Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) No. 314, in eighty-one chapters azid
482 pages.
"oSupra note a.
" CARDOZA.
i
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The radical changes which it caused in our judicial procedure had
not been sought by the Bench and the Bar, or desired by the profession generally; 3' rather they were imposed upon the courts
by sudden and drastic statutory requirement.
The underlying cause may be found in that movement against
class-privilege and in favor of the rights of the common people
which culminated, after years of greater or less intensity, in the
"revolutions of 1848." This many-angled movement convulsed
Europe from the Danube to the Irish Sea with threats of social
and political change. In America it carried no serious threat t*o
the administrative side of the government, but it manifested itself
in an ultra-democratic reform sentiment, stfongly anti-privilege,
anti-expert, anti-specialist. Its main point of attack in America
was the existing judicial system. The judges must be made directly responsible to the people. The law must be recast so that
"a person of common understanding" could know what was intended and could apply it himself. The right of every good citizen to practice law must not be denied him. 34
Whatever the cause, the change in America found the Bench
and the Bar unprepared for it, doubtful as to the results, and
sometimes scornfully hostile.
"My life was a continual warfare. Not only was every obstacle throwir
in the way of my work, but I was attacked personally as an agitator and a
visionary, in seeking to disturb long settled usage, and thinking to reform the
law, in which was embodied the wisdom of ages. This was perhaps to be expected when I undertook such radical changes in the face of the most conservative of professions." David Dudley Field, referring to the opposition
which he had to encounter because 6f the (codes. FIrLD, op. cit. supra note 32,
at 83.
"'Any man may give either medicine or gospel and collect his dues. * * *
I want the lawyers to stand upon the same platform with *the priests and the
doctors. A man's property is no better than his life or his soul"-such was
the argument in the Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1850. ALmIUD
Z. RiED, TRAININGa OR THE PUBLIC PROrESSION Or THz LAW (1921) 89.
It is significant of the strength of this sentiment that the New York Constitution of 1846 abandoned the principle of an appointive judiciary and
adopted the principle of a short term elective judiciary.
This period of social unrest produced in New Hampshire a statute which
made eligible for admission to the Bar any male citizen who was at least
twenty-one years old, and of good moral character. Act of 1842, N. H. Rev.
Stats. c. 177, § 2; HoLLIS R. BAILEY, ADMISSION To THa BAa 59. In Indiana a constitutional provision, which still endures was enacted, that every
person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission
to practice law in all courts of justice. Constitution 1851, Art. VII, § 21.
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IV. IN

THE FIDERAr, COURTS AND CONGRESS.

Halting and Faltering.
In the year 1920 the One Form of Action was an established
working principle of civil procedure for the administration of
legal and equitable relief in twenty-eight States of the Union.
These States had then a population of not quite fifty-five millions,
out of a total population in the forty-eight States of a little more
than one hundred and five millions. In twenty-four of tlese Code
States this principle of procedure had been in continuous operation for at least half a century; in some of them for seventy years
or longer. The same principle had then been in successful operation in England for about forty-five years; in Ontario, for thirtynine years; in New Zealand for thirty-eight years; in Victoria,
for thirty-seven years; in Nova Scotia, for thirty-six years. And
in these jurisdictions outside the United States, the American
reform, as it was at first called, had been carried further than
with us. This was so in various respects which need not be noticed here. But it is especially noteworthy that even in the American Code States the One Form of Action had not been given to
all the courts of record within their boundaries; for the Federal
Courts throughout the Union remained closed to a unit procedure for law and equity. The American reform movement which
has had such a wide and enduring effect in the States of the
Union, and later in other jurisdictions administering our ancestral
common law, had met through many years, a halting and faltering in Congress which outdid the halting and faltering of the English reform movement through the forty years preceding the
-Judicature Acts of 1873-1875.35 This procedural condition
' In 1851 an English law periodical made this comment upon the. reform
movemerit in England and America: "While all people are agreed that reform is needed and while the new common law commission are issuing suggestions, halting and faltering, willing, perhaps, but unable, to free their
minds from that peculiar tone which long and successful practice under our
present system inevitably irduces-a practical people in the western hemisphere have appointed a commission, and, quietly, expeditiously, and cheaply,
and out of laws similar to our own and derived from us, have created a simple, single- and intelligible judiciil system, which has hitherto worked well in
the state (New York) by which it was first sanctioned, and has in consequence
beer adopted by several other states of the American Union. And let us not
forget that it is not among a poor, homely, uneducated, and simple peonii_ that
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still endures throughout the United States. It is the more remarkable because we are now centuries this side of the age when,
in the infancy of the Courts of Justice, substantive law had "the
look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure;"
and lawyers could see the law "only through the envelope of its
technical forms."

31

We are now able, in theory at least, to view

procedure as the machinery of Justice; and we live in the age of
machinery. We are keen to improve it-to make our machinery
more and more efficient. Why should it be necessary, in this day
and in these United States, to change the carburetor of the automobile of Justice whenever we pass, with one and the same substantive cause of action, across a State line or from a State Court
into a Federal Court in the same State.
But a law reform, although gloriously slow in its coming, is
not theretofore to be despaired of. 37 And Congress has been
moving forward, although hesitatingly and through a long course
of years, towards a great reform. Congress has not yet created
one form of Civil Action; but recent statutory provisions, as
Chief Justice Taft points out, "manifest a purpose on the part of
Congress to change from a suit at law to one in equity and the
reverse with as little delay and as little insistence on form as possible, and these are long steps towards Code practice." 28
this great experiment in legislation is being tried, but among a people who are
our rivals in commerce, equal to us at least in intelligence, wealth, and luxury,
with all the wants of.a high state of civilization, and whose laws to be successful must embrace nearly as wide a field as our own. The boldness of the
attempt, and the righteousness of the motives which led to it should at least
command our respect and sympathy. We venture to express a hope that the
example may not be entirely lost upon ourselves, but that it will stimulate our
law reformers to raise their minds at once to the contemplation of a radical
and efficient reform; for they now have before them a proof that it is possible to sweep away all pre-existing laws without rushing into chaos." XIV
Law Magazine (N. S.) (Loqdon), pages 1, 2, 17, 18.
MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CusToMS (1883) 389.
"History shows that great law reforms are accomplished only after long
periods of agitation. Notably has this been the case with the two great systems of law under which Western civilization has developed, that is, the common law which prevails in the English-speaking countries, and the Roman
law, which is at the foundation of the legal systems of the French, Spanish,
Italian and German nations and, recently, of Japan." HtNRY W. TA.r, LAW
RjFORm (1926) 1.
' Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, 260 U. S. 235, 244 (1922).
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There is also the significant movement in behalf of the Uniformity of Procedure Bill, one section of which provides that the
United States Supreme Court "may at any time unite the general
rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at
law, so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for
both." This movement, in the special charge of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,
and under the leadership of its tireless chairman, Mr. Thomas W.
Shelton of Virginia, has now the widest support of Bar Associations throughout the United States and of individual members of
the active profession. Apparently no other proposal for a radical, widespreading change in court procedure has ever received so
extensive a presentation, and such full approval from our active
Bench and Bar. This approval has appeared in Congress also,
where eighty-two Senators and over eighty per cent of the members of the House, responding to a questionnaire, have expressed
themselves in favor of the bill. A Committee rule may once more
block its passage. But it may be, as respects this reform in the
interests of substantial justice, that Congress will presently stand
at an open door with only a threshold to cross.
Charles M. Hepburn.
INDIANA UNIvRSITY ScHool, or LAW.

